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INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND THE CAPITAL
FORMATION PROCESS
Lester Nurick*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The theme of my address will be (a) the principal means
by which the international public lending institutions
(principally the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (the World Bank), the International Development
Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)) join
with others in the channeling of funds from private, governmental and other international sources for development
projects, and (b) some of the main legal problems which arise.
An operation of this kind is usually called a joint
financing operation. However, it should be noted that in
a sense every loan by an international organization for a
project involves joint financing, since the organization
finances only a portion of the cost of the project and the
balance will come from the borrower's own resources or elsewhere. I will deal primarily with cases where the balance
for financing the project is obtained through foreign
borrowing or the provision of equity from foreign sources.
I should also point out that I shall not discuss the
raising of capital by the sale of debt obligations of the
international organization itself. I thus omit a very
important aspect of the capital formation process. The
World Bank alone has sold some $7.5 billion of its debt
obligations and the IADB has sold about $500 million, but
that is a subject for another address.
There are several basic reasons why the international
organizations take an active role in trying to help raise
other funds for channeling into projects which they finance,
as follows:
(a) Under their charters they are not permitted, in
effect, to finance a project for which other funds, particularly from private sources, are available on reasonable
terms. One way to comply with this injunction is to see
to it that they join with funds of others in a particular
financing.
(b) Many projects involving substantial sums of money
could not, as a practical matter, be financed unless other
sources (in addition to those of the sponsor) were tapped.
(c) Where a project is privately owned, the owners
may themselves want the participation of an international
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organization because of their feeling that this will give
them some protection against arbitrary or unreasonable
interference by the host government. And, conversely, the
host government may welcome, and indeed actively seek, the
participation of the international organization of which it
is a member, because the international organization will
often be able to give it technical assistance in the
working out of arrangements for the project and help
investigate whether the arrangements are fair to the government.
There are so many different kinds of joint financing
arrangements that it would be impossible for me now to
describe them all, even in general terms. However, I have
tried to break down the bulk of them into a number of broad
categories, drawing particularly on the experience of the
World Bank which has been most active in this field.
II.

JOINT WORLD BANK-PRIVATE MARKET OPERATIONS

In the early years after World War II, the creditworthiness of foreign governments was not strong enough
for them to be able to borrow in the United States private
capital market, and during this period the main source of
external funds for many of these countries was the World
Bank. As the economies of these countries became stronger
efforts were directed towards opening up the United States
capital market to their bond issues. The World Bank
actively participated in these efforts. Accordingly, joint
World Bank-private market operations were arranged, particularly between 1954 and 1960, to provide finance for
development projects in a number of member countries. Under
these arrangements, agreement was reached with U.S. investment
banking houses whereby a World Bank loan was made to coincide
with the raising of additional funds from private investors
either by means of
(a) public offering of the borrower's
bonds, (b) private placement of securities with institutional
investors, or (c) by a combination of these two methods.
Fifteen such operations were undertaken between
December 1954 and December 1960 involving a total amount
of $562 million, of which $252 million was in World Bank
loans and $310 million in sales of the borrower's securities.
The borrowers involved were the Governments of Austria;
Belgium; Denmark; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland;
Japan; Norway; South Africa; the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno,
an Italian Government agency; the international airlines of
Australia (Qantas) and India (Air India); and the Kawasaki
and Sumitomo Steel Companies in Japan.
The proceeds derived from the market and from the
World Bank's loan were applied in each case to a common
purpose: the financing of a particular development program
within the member country involved. Agreement as to use
of the proceeds was reached beforehand by representatives
of the borrowing country, the investment banking firms,
and the World Bank.

The legal problems in these operations were of two
main kinds:
(a). Questions arising under the Securities
Act of 1933 where a public issue was involved; and (b) complications arising from the necessity to synchronize the
Bank loan and the market issue.
As far as the Securities Act was concerned, the main
problem for the underwriters of the issue was to make sure,
where the borrower was a government, that the prospectus
included an adequate description of the borrowing country.
The Securities Act has no prescribed form governing prospectuses for government issues and in those days there was
little precedent to guide the lawyer responsible for the
prospectus. The pattern has since evolved for these issues,
but in those days it was unclear.
As far as the synchronization of the loan and the
issue were concerned, the effectiveness of the Bank loan
was made conditional on the sale of the public issue. In
addition, in some cases the World Bank loan and the bond
issue were linked in other ways, such as provisions in
regard to the closing,cross-defaults, and prematuring of
the loans. In other respects the private bond issue was
set up in normal form and the World Bank loan similarly
followed the normal practices of the Bank with regard to
effectiveness, disbursement, supervision, and administration
of the loan. Of course, questions concerning the pricing
and maturity of the private bond issue, as well as its
timing, all had to be considered in relation to the fact
that the Bank was making a loan to the same borrower at
the same time.
III.

SALES OF LOANS TO PRIVATE PURCHASERS

The international organizations have raised substantial
sums of money by sales to investors by private placement
of the obligations of its borrowers received in connection
with its loans to them. These sales are now not made with
the guarantee of the international organization although
in the early days of the World Bank's operations they were
sold with the Bank's guarantee. The IADB has sold only
one loan with its guarantee. There are two basic types of
transactions of this kind. In some cases the sales are
arranged at about the time the loan contract is signed and
funds are called when disbursements are made. These transactions are called "participations." In other cases sales
are made after a loan contract has been signed and disbursements have been made. These sales are called "portfolio
sales."
For the most part the obligations sold have been
relatively short-term and have been sold to private commercial
and savings banks and other similar institutions. In
these cases the interest of the purchaser is a relatively
simple one and consists essentially of the right to receive
a certain principal amount of the loan together with interest,

as it is paid off. In these cases the purchaser has no
rights in the administration and supervision of the loan,
and its interest is expressed in a relatively simple
participation agreement.
In a number of cases, however, insurance companies
have bought substantial segments of the entire loan and
complicated investment agreements have been negotiated under
which the insurance companies are given certain rights in
the administration of the loan. In some cases sales of
this kind have been arranged by investment banking houses
who negotiated the deal with the World Bank and were
responsible for finding the purchasers.
By June 30, 1967, the World Bank had arranged to sell
over $2 billion of the obligations of its borrowers. However,
while these sales represented a very substantial adjunct
to the financing of the Bank's loan operations, these sales
have steadily declined since 1963. This decline has been
an outcome of the worldwide scarcity of capital in recent
years and the resulting increase in the general level of
interest rates. This increase has made it difficult for
the Bank to offer yields on loans in its portfolio as attractive
as those in other investments. Consequently, early in 1967
the Bank decided to discontinue selling loans out of its
portfolio except in special circumstances but it has continued
to make participations in loans available to private investors.
An interesting aspect of these arrangements is the fact
that for the most part investors have been willing to rely
on the international organizations to administer the loans
and protect their rights. Several of them have made
independent checks themselves as to the procedures which
the Bank follows in making and disbursing the loans and
the extent to which the Bank satisfies itself as to the
legal formalities, but on the whole, these problems have
been left for the Bank to deal with. It should also be
noted that these obligations of borrowers when sold without
the Bank's guarantee are not exempt from the United States
Securities Act and consequently could be sold in this country
only by private placement. They could, of course, be sold
by a public offering if it was desired to go through the
process of registration, but so far this has been regarded
as impractical and unnecessary.
IV.

JOINT VENTURES

The most significant, and for the lawyer the most
interesting, of the ways in which the international organizations channel international capital into the financing of
projects is the so-called joint venture financing operation.
By this I mean, generally speaking, the case where the international organization joins with one or more other foreign
sources of capital (private or public or both) to finance
a given project under agreed arrangements regarding their

participation in the project. These cases vary greatly
both in the nature of the participants and in the complexity
of the arrangements. I think that the best way for me to
deal with these joint operations is to describe several of
them. I hesitate to say that these cases are typical
because they vary so greatly, but I can say that these
cases illustrate some of the techniques which are followed
and some of the problems which have to be faced.
A.

Alcominas Project

The first kind of case is where the participants other
than the Bank and the sponsors have interests which are
primarily financial. The Alcominas project in Brazil is
an example of this kind of case. In this case two large
American companies, Alcoa and Hanna, together with Brazilian
investors, organized the Alcominas Company, a Brazilian
corporation,to finance an aluminum smelter in Brazil. In
addition to equity subscribed by the shareholders, loans to
Alcominas were made by certain New York banks and by the
World Bank. The World Bank's loan was guaranteed by Brazil.
Aside from the questions concerning the merits of the project
itself, the main problems which arose were primarily of a
financial nature, e.g., the basis on which the shareholders
would participate in the venture, the security arrangements
for the lenders, the relationship between the New York bank
loans and the World Bank loan, and the position of Brazil
as guarantor. In addition, the familiar problems concerning
the effect of United States restrictions on overseas investment had to be considered. I won't attempt to describe
these problems in any detail because, complicated as they
were, they were substantially similar to those which arise
in an ordinary private financing where an international
organization is not involved.
B.

Private Development Corporation of the Philippines

A more complicated kind of case and one which is
becoming more common and important is where the financing
comes from some combination of national and international
development agencies, each of whose interests are broader
than those of an ordinary creditor. In some cases, private
investors may also join in the financing, further complicating
the arrangements.
National aid agencies, such as the AID or Eximbank or
their counterparts in other countries, often have their
own national interests to consider and protect when participating in a joint venture and these interests may be
different from or inconsistent with those of the international
lending agency. For example, the national aid agency may
tie its loans to procurement in its own country. A restriction
of this kind may either affect the availability of funds

to complete the project or may result in the imposition of
unduly high costs to the borrower. Or the national aid
agency may provide in its agreement that it can suspend
disbursements on its loan on grounds which are political
in nature. These types of restrictions are sometimes
difficult to reconcile with those of the international
agency. Similarly, there may be conflicts among the
international financing agencies themselves regarding such
matters as procurement, security arrangements, terms of the
loan, and responsibility for supervision of the use of the
money and for checking on the project. And finally, private
investors have still different interests. They, of course,
are particularly interested in the financial safety of
their investment and in their own financial return. These
interests may well dictate such matters as the form in which
they put in their money, the relation of debt to equity,
the security arrangements they require and the assurances
to be obtained regarding repatriation and protection. Here
again, these interests may not in a given case completely
coincide with those of the public lender and will have to
be reconciled. Consequently, in these cases it is necessary
to work out arrangements to insure that (a) the project
will yield an adequate economic return to the borrowing
country, (b) the project is adequately financed and completed,
(c) the financing documents are consistent, (d) the repayment
provisions are coordinated, and (e) there is no conflict
in administration and project supervision.
An example of this kind of case was the financing in
1963 of the Private Development Corporation of the Philippines
(PDCP), a privately owned investment corporation in the
Philippines. The financing package was as follows:
(a) World Bank loan of $15 million, to the Philippine
National Bank for re-lending to the PDCP, guaranteed
by the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) AID loan of 27.5 million pesos;
(c) Share capital of 25 million pesos, of which
(i) 70 per cent was to be sold to Philippine
investors by public sale and to IFC:
(ii) 30 per cent was to be sold by private
placement to foreign banking and investment
institutions in the United States and
other countries;
(d) A standby commitment by IFC of some of the shares
to be sold to the foreign investors.
problems which were raised by this operation
legal
The
were many and complex. On the Philippine side there were
the normal problems arising in connection with the formation
of a company and the flotation of its securities. Interestingly enough, there are laws in the Philippines which
are very similar to the United States Securities Act of
1933 and the Investment Companies Act of 1940, and these

laws had to be taken into account. In addition, since
the Republic of the Philippines was to guarantee the IBRD
loan it was necessary that there be Philippine legislation
covering the guarantee, a substantial matter by itself.
On the United States side, since securities were being sold
to United States investors at the same time as a public
offering was being made in the Philippines, consideration
had to be given to the question whether registration was
required under the Securities Act.
As far as the relationship between the IBRD and AID
was concerned, their differing procurement requirements
had to be reconciled and agreement had to be reached as
to who would bear the burden of project administration.
And finally, in order to assure each lender or investor
that all the others would go ahead, it was necessary to
make arrangements for a joint closing at which time all
parties simultaneously became bound to make their funds
available as agreed.
C.

Joint Financing of Mineral-Concessions

By far the most complicated of these arrangements is
where a joint financing is arranged to finance a mineral
concession. Since these projects usually involve large
sums of money, they often require financing from many of
the sources described before. In addition to the complications this presents, this type of project often requires
the building of infrastructure facilities. If so, this
adds to the complications, especially where the infrastructure
is owned by the government which, by itself may not be
credit-worthy for a bank loan and financed separately from
the mining part of the project itself. These arrangements
often provide for the furnishing of special security to
the various lenders (e.g., shareholders' guarantees, takeor-pay contracts) and the establishment of trusts outside
the borrowing country in order to implement the security
arrangements. Furthermore, again in view of the large
sums involved, the private sponsors may want a special
regime under which they will operate in the country concerned,
and this regime (usually embodied in a concession) will
have to be carefully negotiated by the country and reviewed
by the international agency. The private sponsors may seek
investment insurance against political risks, e.g., under
the AID investment guaranty program, and this too will
have to be carefully negotiated and dovetailed into the
other financing arrangements. And this is not to mention
the myriad of local problems which often arise in these
joint ventures.
Let me describe a case which illustrates what I
mean: the Volta project in Ghana, the agreements for

which were signed in 1962.
1. Volta Project in Ghana. This project was set up
as separate but related components. First, a dam would
be built by the Government of Ghana and financed from
public sources. Second, an aluminum smelter would process
alumina into aluminum ingot and would be financed by private
capital - with some governmental help - and run as a private

commercial operation. Probably never in financial history
have so many lawyers worked so long and produced so many
documents with so many complexities as in this project.
While, therefore, the project is not typical, it does
incorporate in one package many of the features found
scattered in other projects. It also illustrates the unique
role an international agency can sometimes play in projects
of this kind, for while the amount of the World Bank's loan
was large, the role of the Bank in helping to work out the
arrangements for the project was larger still. There were
so many conflicts - financial, legal and political - and

the interests involved were so substantial that it was
highly desirable that a non-political, objective party be
available to provide at least a forum for the negotiations
and to render its good offices, when called upon, to try
to settle differences. This role was filled by the World
Bank.
The parties and the financing were as follows:
1.

The dam, estimated to cost $196 million and to
be built by the Volta River Authority, a Ghana
Government agency, was financed as follows:
World Bank

-

$47 million

AID

-

$27 million

Eximbank

-

$10 million

United Kingdom

-

$14 million

Ghana

- the balance

(estimated

50 per cent of total)
2.

The smelter, estimated to cost $128 million and
to be owned by a private Ghanaian company called
Valco, which was owned entirely by the Kaiser and
Reynolds Aluminum Companies, was to be originally
financed as follows:
Sponsoring shareholders
(Kaiser and Reynolds)

$12 million (equity)
$20 million (debt)

Eximbank

$96 million

AID - Political risk guaranty of Kaiser and
Reynolds' investment in Valco
The-economics of the project were such that the dam
would not be economic unless the smelter bought a substantial
part of the power to be generated; and the smelter could
not operate unless it were assured of a continuous,
inexpensive supply of power from the dam.
The problem arose therefore, as far as both the Volta
River Authority and the lenders to the Authority were
concerned, as to how they could be assured that Valco, the
smelter company, would build the smelter and then, having
built it, be able to pay for the power. The problem was
complicated by the fact that it would take about five
years to build the dam and about two years to build the
smelter; thus almost all the dam money would have been spent
before the smelter was even started. Because of this,
the Authority and its lenders wanted legal assurances that
if the dam were built the smelter would be built also.
On the aluminum side, the converse problem arose, namely
how could the aluminum companies be assured-that if they
built the smelter they would be assured of a continuous
supply of power. Also, a whole set of problems arose because
of the fact that the smelter was being built in Ghana, a
country whose policies at that time under Nkrumah presented
certain difficulties to a private investor.
These problems were met by a complex set of agreements.
The two principal agreements in defining the relations
between the Government of Ghana and Valco were the Master
Agreement and the Power Contract. These two agreements
were the foundation on which all the other agreements rest.
The Master Agreement is a concession agreement on a
very comprehensive scale and covers the basic elements
involved in doing business in Ghana - taxes, exchange authority,
port, water and land rights, and other matters.
The Power Contract does two main things: It provides
that certain specified amounts of power will be made available
to Valco over a 30-year period at a fixed price, thus
assuring Valco of a firm power supply. It is also a socalled "take-or-pay" contract-that is, it provides that
Valco will either buy a specified amount of power, or in
any event pay a minimum charge whether or not used. This
take-or-pay arrangement is intended to assure the Authority
of amounts sufficient to pay its loans.
This was all right as far as it went, but it did not
go far enough so far as the lenders to the Authority were
concerned. It was not enough to receive assurances only
from Valco that the smelter would be built and power paid
for. After all, Valco would be only a corporate shell until

the smelter was built. It was also necessary to obtain
assurances from Valco's shareholders, Kaiser and Reynolds.
A straight guarantee of payment of the loans would,
of course, have been fine for the lenders, but for various
reasons, including restrictions in their outstanding
indentures, a guarantee was not acceptable to the aluminum
companies.
As an alternative, agreement was reached on a Voting
Trust arrangement under which:
the stock of Valco owned by the aluminum companies
was deposited with a voting trustee, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co.; and
if Valco defaulted in its obligations either
(b)
to build the smelter or make required payments,
the voting trustee was to install a new management
until the default was cured.
In addition, under two other agreements the shareholders
agreed to subscribe certain moneys to build the.project
(the Subscription Agreement) and to use and pay for over
a 30-year period the smelting services of Valco in amounts
sufficient to pay the debts incurred to build both the
dam and the smelter (Tolling Contracts).
So far as the aluminum companies were concerned, in
addition to the protection'in the Master Agreement and Power
Contract, they wanted protection against certain political
riskS. This was afforded by two additional agreements:
(a) the Political Risk Guaranty, which Kaiser and Reynolds
obtained from AID, and (b) the Valco Current Accounts
Trust, under which moneys received by Valco were to be
paid to a trustee in New York who was directed to use them
for certain specified purposes.
Together with these problems there arose the problems
I have described before in coordinating the requirements
of each lender. Each lender was interested in the success
of the entire project and the simplest thing would have
been to have one common agreement. However, the particular
requirements of each lender made that impractical. For
example, World Bank loans cannot be tied to purchases in
any particular country. The Eximbank loan was tied to United
States purchases; the AID and United Kingdom loans were
also tied, but not so-rigidly. Interest rates varied
among the lenders. For these and other reasons, each lender
ended up with a separate agreement, but nevertheless with
interlocking covenants and events of default.
A final word for those interested in conflict of laws.
Questions of applicable law, force majeure and jurisdiction
turned out to be, as they often do, crucial and difficult
matters to negotiate.
(a)

The applicable law clauses in the main agreements
were as follows:
Agreement
Concession, Power Contract,
and Subscription Agreement

Applicable Law
Ghana, at time of
signing of contract;
but subject to arbitration under the rules
of the International
Chamber of Commerce
in Switzerland

New York
Trusts and Tolling Contracts
International
World Bank Loan Agreement
New York
Eximbank Loan Agreements
District of Columbia
AID Loan Agreement
No clause specified
United Kingdom Loan Agreement
As you can see, the Project and the financing represented
a blend of international and national institutions, of
private and public capital, all joined in a common cause.
2.
Boke Project in Guinea. A more recent example of
this type of joint venture is the financing of the Boke
project in Guinea, one of the richest bauxite deposits in
the world. These agreements were signed in September 1968,
and the project is now being built. The project consists,
as did the Volta project, of two inter-related elements:
(a) the construction of a railroad and related facilities
to be used primarily for the transport of bauxite, and
(b) the construction of bauxite mining installations.
The infrastructure facilities were to be owned and operated
by the Government of Guinea and to be financed by loans from
the World Bank ($64.5 million) to finance the foreign
exchange cost and from AID (the equivalent of $21 million
in Guinean francs) to finance local currency costs. The
bauxite mine, expected to cost about $100 million, is to
be constructed, operated and owned by a private Guinean
company (CBG), owned jointly by the Halco Mining Company
Halco
(51 per cent) and the Guinea Government (49 per cent),
in turn is owned by large international aluminum companies.
The private shareholders have agreed, in effect, to complete
the mining installations in accordance with an agreed
schedule, to buy substantial amounts of bauxite, and to provide
special security arrangements to secure repayment of the
World Bank loan. The return to the Government of Guinea
will come primarily from a tax on CBG's profits.
Again as in Volta, the American sponsors obtained a
political risk guaranty covering their investment from AID.
As you can see, the structure of the project and the
problems which had to be faced were similar to those in the
Volta.

V.

CONCLUSION

The examples I have given in this talk deal primarily
with cases where there have been large American interests
involved, both from private and public sectors. But there
are many cases where projects have been financed from private
and public sources in other countries, particularly French,
British, German, and Swedish. And, while these joint
financings raise many of the same problems I have described
before, they also differ in many respects because of different
national requirements and different legal systems. But
that too is the subject of another talk.

